



MIT NETWORK SECURITY

MARK SILIS & DAVE LAPORTE




ABOUT IS&T


IS&T Services Organization Chart




THE INTERNET: CIRCA 1980



THE INTERNET: ~TODAY



MIT CAMPUS NETWORK





1994-1998

1998-2000

2000-2005

2005-2008

Asante 2072

10 Mb/s Shared
 72 ports (\$80 per port)
 17 Units (0.6%)
 1,224 Ports (1.25%)
 Cat3 Cabling

Asante 5324

10 Mb/s Switched
 24 ports (\$100 per port)
 150 Units (5.6%)
 3,600 Ports (3.7%)
 Cat3 Cabling

Cabletron 2200

100 Mb/s Switched
 24 ports (\$145 per port)
 931 Units (34.8%)
 22,344 Ports (22.9%)
 Cat5 Cabling

Enterasys C2

1 Gb/s Switched
 24 ports (\$175 per port)
 224 Units (8.4%)
 5,376 Ports (5.5%)
 Cat5 Cabling



2008-2010

2010-Present


Cisco 3560E

1 Gb/s Switched
 48 ports (\$140 per port)
 773 Units (29.5%)
 37,104 Ports (38%)
 Cat6 Cabling


Cisco 3560X

1 Gb/s Switched
 48 ports (\$110 per port)
 583 Units (11.7%)
 27,984 Ports (28.7%)
 Cat6 Cabling

1,332 units
 &
 32,544 ports
 Targeted for renewal



THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING



MIT PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Draft

TEL/DATA CLOSETS BEING RE-PURPOSED



TEL/DATA CLOSETS CREATIVELY USED IN DORMS



TODAY'S SECURITY LANDSCAPE

Cyber Crime




Hacktivism



Cyber Warfare




ZERO DAY EXPLOITS




(a) Attacks exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities before and after the disclosure (time = t_0).

WHAT MIGHT THIS BE?




DDOS ATTACKS



DDOS ATTACKS

Recent DDoS



PROTECTING MIT'S EXTERNAL WEB PRESENCE



EDGE HITS Apr 18 12:00 AM - Apr 21 11:59 PM GMT.



Edge Hits

Edge Total **37,792,201**

Peak at 4/19/13 3:15 AM **565.643**

Latest at 4/21/13 11:45 PM **76.597**


MIT DOMAIN HIJACK



ATTACK #1 - THE INFRASTRUCTURE

- Routers
 - Target control plane
 - Disabling router disables all downstream resources
- Firewalls
 - Maintain state, which can be exploited
 - Reassemble packets by design
 - Often configured to log permit/deny actions

ATTACK #2 - MIT.EDU



The image is a screenshot of a web browser displaying a memorial page for Aaron Swartz. The browser's address bar shows "www.mit.edu". The page content is mostly obscured by a dark overlay, but the following text is visible:

R.I.P Aaron Swartz
Hacked by grand wizard of Lulzsec, Sabu

G O D B L E S S A M E R I C A
D O W N W I T H A N O N Y M O U S

The background text, which is partially visible through the dark overlay, appears to be a personal reflection or a letter. It discusses moral dilemmas, such as the trolley problem and the morality of killing animals or blowing up people in Afghanistan. It also mentions Peter Singer and the possibility of saving a child's life for a small amount of money.

MIT.EDU - THE ATTACK

Domain Name: MIT.EDU

Registrant:

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
UNITED STATES

Administrative Contact:

I got owned
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT Room W92-167, 77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
UNITED STATES
(617) 324-1337
cunt@mit.edu

Technical Contact:


OWNED NETWORK OPERATIONS
ROOT
US
DESTROYED, MA 02139-4307
UNITED STATES
(617) 253-1337
owned@mit.edu

Name Servers:

FRED.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
KATE.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM


Domain record activated: 23-May-1985
Domain record last updated: 22-Jan-2013
Domain expires: 31-Jul-2013

MIT.EDU - WHAT HAPPENED




MIT.EDU - WHAT HAPPENED

Maintained by EDUCAUSE




MIT.EDU - WHAT HAPPENED

Maintained by EDUCAUSE



MIT.EDU - WHAT HAPPENED



MIT.EDU – THE TROLL

From Gizmodo comments:

Hack went down like this:

- 1. Own the MIT NOC guy with a browser exploit*
- 2. Get their educause logins, which were: [Redacted]*
- 3. Create cloudflare account, set the dns records. (Deface was hosted on a multitude of servers one of them provided by harvard. (All of which are now down, DDoS? I don't know.))*
- 4. Change their mail settings in cloudflare page.*
- 5. At 12:00 EST we logged into the domain control panel and changed the DNS records and the password.*

After that mit staff tried uselessly resetting the password but the email ended up on our servers. Eventually educause (the people that manage .edu domains) just locked the domain and took it all down.

Now the interesting part here is that cloudflare staff changed our domain name records in the middle of it all going down (They've previously stated that they wouldn't touch user data without a court order)

MIT.EDU - HOW IT HAPPENED

From HTP Zine 5 (<http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/25306/>):

Soon after, we decided to troll Gizmodo and the rest of the media into preserving our access. The 'browser exploit' on MIT's NOC (<http://gizmodo.com/5978039/hackers-incoherently-deface-entire-mit-website>) never existed. We'd never show our full hand at once, we'd just lose access.

MIT certainly believed us though, despite their own reassurances otherwise. For confirmation, they contacted the root registrar for EDU domains (EDUCAUSE) after finally asserting that we got access to their EDUCAUSE account.

EDUCAUSE then made the fatal mistake of overlooking our complete access into the EDU TLD. Though, we can't say we expect much from a registrar running ASPX on their backend.

MIT.EDU – HOW IT HAPPENED

- EDUCAUSE registry was hacked
 - ~7000 .edu domains were vulnerable

EDUCAUSE SECURITY BREACH AND PASSWORD CHANGE INFORMATION

As of 2/19/13

In February 2013, EDUCAUSE discovered a security breach involving an EDUCAUSE server. Below are answers to questions about this breach.

Who was affected and what data was involved?

1. Individuals with an EDUCAUSE website profile

1. Any information contained in individual EDUCAUSE website profiles (e.g., name, title, e-mail address, username, and hashed password) may have been compromised. As a result, individuals with an EDUCAUSE website profile must [change their password](#).
2. It is not necessary for InCommon account holders to update their institutional credentials because EDUCAUSE does not have access to, or store on any server, InCommon account information.

2. .edu domain accounts

1. The breach may have compromised the hashed passwords of .edu domain holders. As a result, the designated administrative, technical, or billing contact must [change the domain password](#). Administrative and technical contacts have already been notified by EDUCAUSE.

As a precaution, **all passwords have already been deactivated**; therefore, individuals do not need to create new passwords immediately.

Members and individuals who do not have an EDUCAUSE website profile or are not a .edu domain holder are not required to take action.

FUTURE SECURITY LANDSCAPE



QUESTIONS?

Draft