

CLIENT-SIDE STATIC ANALYSIS

Ben Livshits, Microsoft Research


Overview of Today's Lecture

2

- Client-side JavaScript
 - ▣ Analysis of JavaScript
 - ▣ eval and code obfuscation
 - ▣ Need for runtime enforcement
- Gatekeeper as illustration
- Browser
 - ▣ Plugins
- Extensions
 - ▣ Firefox extension model
 - ▣ Chrome extension model
 - ▣ Looking forward


Layers of Browser Security

3



App Store: Centralized Software Distribution

4



Static Analysis

5

Last time

- Server-side analysis
- Benign but buggy code

Today

- Client-side analysis
- Buggy or **potentially malicious code**

Analysis soundness really helps

Same Origin Policy Is Not Enough

6

- Primary focus: statically enforcing security and reliability policies for JavaScript code
- These policies include semantic properties
 - restricting widget capabilities,
 - making sure built-in objects are not modified,
 - preventing code injection attempts,
 - redirect and cross-site scripting detection,
 - preventing global namespace pollution,
 - taint checking,
 - etc.
- Soundly enforcing security policies is hard



Gatekeeper

Mostly Static Enforcement of
Security & Reliability Policies for JavaScript Code


```
alert( 'hi' );
```

program



malicious

Catch me if you can



don't
want to
allow alert
box



can we
figure this
out
statically?


```
alert('hi');
```

```
document.write(  
"<script>alert('hi');</script>");
```

```
var d = document;  
var w = d.write;  
w("<script>alert('hi');");
```

```
eval ("do"+"cu"+"ment.write ("+...
```

```
var e = window.eval;  
e ("do"+"cu"+"ment.write ("..." );
```

```
var e = new Function("eval");  
e.call(  
    "do"+"cu"+"ment.write("..");
```

```
var e = new  
    Function(unescape("%65%76%61%6C"));  
e.call("do"+"cu"+"ment.write("..");
```

Gatekeeper

Static analysis for JavaScript

- General technology we developed for JavaScript
- Can use for performance optimizations, etc.

This paper

- Use to enforce security and reliability policies
- Analyze Web widgets

Focus on *whole program analysis*. Contrast with:

- JavaScript language subsets (do a little of)
- JavaScript code rewriting (do a little of)

**Goal of
Gatekeeper:**


**Reason about
JavaScript code
statically**



```
alert('hi');
```



Gatekeeper



JavaScript Widgets

iGoogle

Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky

ature themes for your iGoogle page.

The screenshot shows a portion of an iGoogle page. On the left, there are three weather widgets for Palo Alto, CA (33°C), Seattle, WA (19°C), and Kirkland, WA (20°C). Each widget includes a current weather icon, temperature, and a 4-day forecast. In the center, there is a 'msnbc.com: Travel' widget with links to travel news. Below that is a 'Movies: 98033' widget featuring trailers for 'G.I. Joe: The Rise of Cobra', 'The Ugly Truth', and 'Funny People'. At the bottom, there is a 'BBC News' widget with links to news articles.

```
// register your Gadget's namespace
registerNamespace("GadgetGamez");

// define the constructor for your Gadget (this must match the name in the manifest xml)
GadgetGamez.gg2manybugs = function(p_elSource, p_args, p_namespace) {
    // always call initializeBase before anything else!
    GadgetGamez.gg2manybugs.initializeBase(this, arguments);

    // setup private member variables
    var m_this = this;
    var m_el = p_elSource;
    var m_module = p_args.module;

    /**
     * initialize Method
     */
    // initialize is always called immediately after your object is instantiated
    this.initialize = function(p_objScope)
    {
        // always call the base object's initialize first!
        GadgetGamez.gg2manybugs.getBaseMethod(this, "initialize", "Web.Bindings.Base").call(this,
p_objScope);

        var url = "http://www.gadgetgamez.com/live/2manybugs.htm"

        m_iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
        m_iframe.scrolling = "yes";
        m_iframe.frameBorder = "0";
        m_iframe.src = url;
        m_iframe.width="95%";
        m_iframe.height="250px";
        p_elSource.appendChild(m_iframe);
    };
    GadgetGamez.gg2manybugs.registerBaseMethod(this, "initialize");

    /**
     * dispose Method
     */
    this.dispose = function(p_blnUnload) {
        //TODO: add your dispose code here

        // null out all member variables
        m_this = null;
    }
};
```

Sample iGoogle Gadget



15

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<Module>
<ModulePrefs height="325" title="requestShareApp Example" >
  <Require feature="views" />
  <Require feature="opensocial-0.9" />
</ModulePrefs>
<Content type="html" view="home, canvas">
<![CDATA[
  <script type="text/javascript">
function shareApp() {
  var recipient = null;
  var reason = opensocial.newMessage('Install this gadget
opensocial.requestShareApp(recipient, reason, function(r
  if (response != null && response.hasError()) {
    alert('requestShareApp Error Code[' + response.getEr
  } else if (response != null) {
    alert ('requestShareApp OK, Data[' + gadgets.json.st
  } else {
    alert('requestShareApp callback has null response');
  } });
};
</script>
<div style="text-align: center">
  
  ]]>
</Content>
</Module>
```




Widgets are everywhere...

We use over 8,500 widgets to evaluate Gatekeeper



Gatekeeper: Deployment Step on Widget Host



Widget:

```
...  
alert('hi');  
...
```

**Hosting site: control widgets
by enforcing policies:**

- **No alert**
- **No redirects**
- **No document.write**

Outline

- **Statically analyzable subset JavaScript_{SAFE}**
- **Points-to analysis for JavaScript**
- **Formulate nine security & reliability policies**
- **Experiments**

TECHNIQUES

Start with Entire JavaScript...

EcmaScript-262

```
var e = new Function("eval");  
e.call(  
    "do"+"cu"+"ment.write("...");
```

```
var e = new  
    Function(unescape("%65%76%61%6C"));  
e.call("do"+"cu"+"ment.write("...");
```

Remove `eval` & Friends...

EcmaScript 262

- `eval`
- `setTimeout`
- `setInterval`
- `Function`
- `with`
- `arguments` array

= JavaScript_{GK}

Remove Unresolved Array Accesses...

EcmaScript 262

JavaScript_{GK}

- innerHTML assignments
- non-const array access `a[x+y]`

= JavaScript_{SAFE}

```
var z = 'ev' + x + 'al';  
var e = document[z];
```

eval is back!

Now, this is Amenable to Analysis!

EcmaScript 262

JavaScript_{GK}


JavaScript_{GK} – need basic instrumentation to prevent runtime code introduction

JavaScript_{SAFE}

```
s ::=  
  // assignments  
  v1=v2  
  v = bot  
  return v  
  // calls  
  v = new v0(v1,...,vn)  
  v=v0(vthis,v1,...,vn)  
  // heap  
  v1=v2.f  
  v1.f=v2  
  // declarations  
  v=function(v1,...,vn){s}
```


JavaScript_{SAFE} – can analyze fully statically without resorting to runtime checks

How Many Widgets are in the Subsets?



Sound analysis:

ensures that our
policy checkers find *all*
violations



Points-to Analysis in Gatekeeper

% Basic rules

```
PTSTo( $v, h$ )           :- ALLOC( $v, h$ ).
PTSTo( $v, h$ )           :- FUNCDECL( $v, h$ ).
PTSTo( $v_1, h$ )         :- PTSTo( $v_2, h$ ), ASSIGN( $v_1, v_2$ ).

DIRECTHEAPSTORESTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ) :- STORE( $v_1, f, v_2$ ), PTSTo( $v_1, h_1$ ), PTSTo( $v_2, h_2$ ).
DIRECTHEAPPOINTSTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ) :- DIRECTHEAPSTORESTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ).
PTSTo( $v_2, h_2$ )       :- LOAD( $v_2, v_1, f$ ), PTSTo( $v_1, h_1$ ), HEAPPTSTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ).
HEAPPTSTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ) :- DIRECTHEAPPOINTSTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ).
```

% Call graph

```
CALLS( $i, m$ )           :- ACTUAL( $i, 0, c$ ), PTSTo( $c, m$ ).
```

% Interprocedural assignments

```
ASSIGN( $v_1, v_2$ )       :- CALLS( $i, m$ ), FORMAL( $m, z, v_1$ ), ACTUAL( $i, z, v_2$ ),  $z > 0$ .
ASSIGN( $v_2, v_1$ )       :- CALLS( $i, m$ ), METHODRET( $m, v_1$ ), CALLRET( $i, v_2$ ).
```

% Prototype handling

```
HEAPPTSTo( $h_1, f, h_2$ ) :- PROTOTYPE( $h_1, h$ ), HEAPPTSTo( $h, f, h_2$ ).
```

e fly

n Datalog

Datalog Policy for Preventing `document.write`

```
1. DocumentWrite(i) :-  
2.   PointsTo("global", h1),  
3.   HeapPointsTo(h1, "document", h2),  
4.   HeapPointsTo(h2, "write", h3),  
5.   Calls(i, h3).
```

```
document.write('<iframe id="dynstuff" src=""  
' + iframeprops + '></iframe>')
```

EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

Policies for Widget Security & Reliability

36 lines

```
AlertCalls(i) :- PointsTo("global", h), HeapPointsTo(h, "alert", h2), Calls(i, h2) .

DocumentWrite(i) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "document", h2), HeapPointsTo(h2, "write", h3), Calls(i, h3) .
DocumentWrite(i) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "document", h2), HeapPointsTo(h2, "writeln", h3), Calls(i, h3) .
InnerHTML(v) :- Store(v, "innerHTML", _) .

BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "String", h) .
BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Date", h) .
BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Array", h) .
BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Boolean", h) .
BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Math", h) .

BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Function", h) .
BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Document", h) .
BuiltinObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "Window", h) .

Reaches(h1, f, h2) :- HeapPointsTo(h1, f, h2) .
Reaches(h1, f, h2) :- HeapPointsTo(h1, _, h), Reaches(h, f, h2) .

FrozenViolation(v, h1) :- Store(v, _, _), PointsTo(v, h1), BuiltinObject(h1) .
FrozenViolation(v, h1) :- Store(v, _, _), PointsTo(v, h1), BuiltinObject(h2), Reaches(h2, f, h1) .

LocationObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "location", h) .
WindowObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "window", h) .

StoreToLocationObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "window", h2), DirectHeapStoreTo(h2, "location", h) .
StoreToLocationObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "document", h2), DirectHeapStoreTo(h2, "location", h) .
StoreToLocationObject(h) :- PointsTo("global", h1), DirectHeapStoreTo(h1, "location", h) .

StoreInLocationObject(h) :- LocationObject(h1), DirectHeapStoreTo(h1, _, h) .

CallLocationMethod(i) :- LocationObject(h), HeapPointsTo(h, "assign", h1), Calls(i, h1) .
CallLocationMethod(i) :- LocationObject(h), HeapPointsTo(h, "reload", h1), Calls(i, h1) .
CallLocationMethod(i) :- LocationObject(h), HeapPointsTo(h, "replace", h1), Calls(i, h1) .

WindowOpenMethodCall(i) :- WindowObject(h1), HeapPointsTo(h1, "open", h2), Calls(i, h2) .
```

Apply to all
widgets

ie.com only

a Sidebar only

Policy Checking Results



False Positives

common.js:

```
function MM_preloadImages() {
  var d=m_Doc;
  if(d.images){
    if(!d.MM_p) d.MM_p=new Array();
    var i,j=d.MM_p.length,
a=MM_preloadImages.arguments;
    for(i=0; i<a.length; i++)
      if (a[i].indexOf("#")!=0){
        d.MM_p[j]=new Image;
        d.MM_p[j++].src=a[i];
      }
  }
}
```

- Why not more false positives?
 - Most violations are local
 - But this is policy-specific
 - a global taint policy might produce other results

Conclusions

Gatekeeper: Static analysis for JavaScript

Technique: points-to analysis

Focus: analyzing widgets

Results:

- **1,341 policy violations**
- **false positives affect 2 widgets**

Windows Live - Windows Internet Explorer
http://www.live.com/

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Alexa Search Info 9 Netvibes • Microsoft Corporation • Flickr • WordPress • del.icio.us • QDB amazon.com

DOGPILE Web Search Type Search Here Fetch 0 blocked abcNEWS ds Hot Despite Cooling Market Yellow Pages White Pages

Ask Search Web Highlight PopSwatter MyStuff Sign In Zoom News Weather

DAP Options Softwa D/L 0 files DAP Drive

Y! Search Web Mail My Yahoo! Answers Fantasy Sports Hockey

altavista Search the Web Translate Highlight On Last Search

AOL MapQuest

mamma

wordz Lookup: Search SEO PP

JOBSEARCH TOOLBAR

GoodSearch

SpiderPilot.com

Google G

FOX NEWS

mywebsearch

Win

Options | Personalize page

Live Search

Done Internet | Protected Mode: Off 100%

3 Firefox Windows... X-Chat [1... part4 - N... ie7mess1... 2 Intern...

9:35 PM

Question of the day

What is the difference between
browser extensions and
browser plugins?

Browser Plugins

34

- Plugins
 - ▣ Flash
 - ▣ Adobe PDF reader
 - ▣ On their way out?

- Come in different flavors
 - ▣ ActiveX
 - ▣ Firefox extensions
 - ▣ Chrome extensions

Plugin Security

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- Plugins are often worst offenders when it comes to security
 - ▣ True of malware
 - ▣ Of use of DEP/ASLR

- Isolation technologies proposed
 - ▣ Run plugins in their own processes
 - ▣ Low privilege processes if possible

- Sandboxing techniques
 - ▣ Native client
 - ▣ XAX

Plugin Security

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Google Chrome Blog

The latest news from
the Google Chrome team

PDF goodness in Chrome

Thursday, November 4, 2010 | 12:20 PM

With every Google Chrome release, we hope to bring new features and improvements that will make your life on the web speedier, simpler, and more secure. Today, we're excited to introduce the integrated PDF viewer to the [beta channel](#).

[PDF](#) is a popular file format that's used for delivering documents on the web (such as the IRS [W-4 tax form](#)). To open a PDF document, you'd typically need to install additional software or a browser plug-in in order to view it in a web browser. With the integrated Chrome PDF viewer now available in Chrome's beta, you can open a PDF document in Chrome without installing additional software. The PDF document will load as quickly and seamlessly as a normal web page in the browser.

Just like we do with web pages viewed in Chrome, we've built in an additional layer of [security](#) called the "sandbox" around the Chrome PDF viewer to help protect you from malware and security attacks that are targeted at PDF files. For now, the Chrome PDF viewer is available only in the [beta channel](#), but we look forward to adding more polish and features, as well as making it widely available in the stable channel soon.

Posted by John Abd-El-Malek, Software Engineer

All Things Google Chrome!

[Google Chrome YouTube Channel](#)

[Download Google Chrome](#)

[Chromium Blog](#)

[Chromium Homepage](#)

[Chrome on Facebook](#)

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Archive

2011 (36) ▾

Extension Space: an Overview

37

- Mozilla Firefox
 - ▣ Dominates this space with 1,000s of extensions available
 - ▣ Millions of downloads
 - ▣ Security is not great: rogue extensions, buggy extensions
 - ▣ Relies on a community review process to ensure quality

- Google Chrome
 - ▣ Extension manifests
 - ▣ Runtime enforcement of manifests within the browser

Chrome Access Control Manifest

38

```
"content_scripts": [  
  {  
    "all_frames": true,  
    "js": ["blocker.js"],  
    "matches": ["http://*/*/", "https://*/*/"],  
    "run_at": "document_idle"  
  },  
  {  
    "all_frames": true,  
    "js": ["scanner.js"],  
    "matches": ["http://*/*/", "https://*/*/"],  
    "run_at": "document_idle"  
  }  
],
```

311 of 1,137 featured / popular extensions have access to
“your data on all websites”.

Question: What do extensions really do?

Ghostery by Ghostery
 ★★★★★ (70) - 18,822 users - Weel
 Protect you

Mel Jun 26, 2010
 Yo dawg, I heard yo
 tracking you so you

Confirm Installation

Install Ghostery?

This extension needs access to:

- Your data on all websites
- Your browsing history

Install Cancel

Private Filtering
 available on other

ck who's

DETECT:
 Ghostery sees the "invisible" web, detectin
 beacons placed on web pages by ad netwo
 publishers, and other companies interested in your activity

PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY:
 Ghostery is built and maintained for users that care about their online privacy, and is
 engine
 regist

James Jul 19, 2010 [Mark as spam](#)
 Is this a scam? Shi*, I so nearly downloaded it. Why does it have so many good reviews then?


block imag

Jul 8, 2010 [Mark as spam](#)
DO NOT DOWNLOAD!!! SCAM & PHISHING EXTENSION!!!


anonymous Jul 5, 2010 [Mark as spam](#)
 this is stoopid

asmp Jul 5, 2010 [Mark as spam](#)
 This extension is dangerous... blog.betteradvertising.com/2010/01/19/better-advertising-acquires-ghostery/ man! To think I was almost installing this piece of sh.....

GhostRank data is anonymous, it is NEVER used for advertising targeting purposes, and is only shared in an aggregated, non-personal, statistical form.



311 of 1,137 featured / popular extensions have access to “your data on all websites”.




Verified Security for Browser Extensions

Nikhil Swamy

With Arjun Guha, Matthew Fredrikson, and Ben Livshits

[Oakland S&P, 2011]


Developer



arbitrary (Apple)
too permissive (Mozilla)

submit

reject



Curator


cross-platform
extensions are hard

accept



Users

precise policy +




Developer

1. No runtime security checks (fast)
2. No security exceptions (robust)

predictable, reliable

submit

reject



accept


make this easier




Curator


1. Automate policy compliance checking
2. Tools to understand policies

Users





<https://api.del.icio.us/v1/posts/add?url=http://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang&description=Jean+Yang>



getName and
getWebsites
do not exist. ...

```
let name = document.getName() in  
let website = document.getWebsites()[0] in
```

...

Policy: Can read <td class="data"> tags

```
...  
<th class="label">Co  
▼<td class="data">  
  ▼<table class="uiInfoTable noBorder">  
    ▼<tbody>  
      ▼<tr>  
        <th class="label">Email:</th>  
        ▼<td class="data">  
          "jean.yang.writeme@gmail.com"  
          "jeanyang@mit.edu"  
        </td>  
      </tr>  
    </tbody>  
  ▼<tbody>  
    ▼<tr>  
      <th class="label">Mobile Phone:</th>  
      <td class="data"> [REDACTED] </td>  
    </tr>  
  </tbody>  
▼<tbody>  
  ▼<tr>  
    <th class="label">Website:</th>  
    ▼<td class="data">  
      <a href="http://people.csail.mit.edu/  
      jean.yang">http://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang</a>  
      <a href="http://jxyzabc.blogspot.com">http://jxyzabc.blogspot.com</a>  
      <a href="http://gsc.mit.edu/gwamit">http://gsc.mit.edu/gwamit</a>  
    </td>  
  </tr>  
  ...
```

Policy: can read `<td class="data">` tags, which have a sibling `<td class="label">Website:</td>`

```
▼ <tr>
  <th class="label">Email:</th>
  ▼ <td class="data">
    "jean.yang.writeme@gmail.com"
    "jeanyang@mit.edu"
  </td>
</tr>
</tbody>
▼ <tbody>
  ▼ <tr>
    <th class="label">Mobile Phone:</th>
    <td class="data"> [REDACTED] </td>
  </tr>
</tbody>
▼ <tbody>
  ▼ <tr>
    <th class="label">Website:</th>
    ▼ <td class="data">
      <a href="http://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang">http://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang</a>
      <a href="http://jxyzabc.blogspot.com">http://jxyzabc.blogspot.com</a>
      <a href="http://gsc.mit.edu/gwamit">http://gsc.mit.edu/gwamit</a>
    </td>
  </tr>
  ...
```

typical,
application-
specific policy

Facebook | Jean Yang

http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=11544&v=info&ref=ts

Meagan Kruman, Yiyang Xu, Dan Grossman

Events
2 upcoming events

Medicines for Neglected Diseases...
BU School of Law
Friday, September 10 at 7:00pm

Stefan and Nate's 25th Birthda...
EVERYWHERE! (in Boston)
Saturday, September 18 at 8:00pm

Photos
2 of 26 albums See All

Wall Photos
Updated about a week ago

Settling Back into Seattle
Updated about 2 weeks ago

Notes
2 notes See All

grammatical correctness of picture labelling
9:52am Aug 22 | 10 Comments

i wonder how this works
6:29am Aug 22 | 2 Comments

Gifts
4 of 12 gifts

From: Adam

From: Ann

From: Yao

From: Andrew

Grad School

College

High School

Likes and Int

Activities

Interests

Music

Books

```

assume forall (l:elt) .
  EltAttr l "className" "action actionspro_a"
=> CanReadAttr l "href"

assume forall (l:elt), (p:elt) .
  EltAttr p "id" "profile_name"
&& EltParent p l
=> CanReadValue l

assume forall (e_label:elt), (e_label_txt:elt) .
  EltParent e_label e_label_txt
&& EltAttr e_label "className" "label"
=> CanReadValue e_label_txt

assume forall (e_data:elt), (e_label:elt), (e_label_txt:elt),
  (e_data_txt:elt), (e_p:elt) .
  EltParent e_p e_data
&& EltParent e_p e_label
&& EltParent e_data e_data_txt
&& EltParent e_label e_label_txt
&& EltAttr e_label "className" "label"
&& EltTextValue e_label_txt "Website:"
=> CanReadAttr e_data_txt "href"

```

Visualize

Mrs Dalloway

Show other Pages

Contact Information

Contact Info

Email: jean.yang.write@gmail.com
jeanyang@mit.edu

Mobile Phone: 4123026391

Website: http://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang

Chat (14)

Facebook | Jean Yang

http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=11544&v=info&ref=ts

Settling Back into Seattle
Updated about 2 weeks ago

Notes
2 notes See All

- grammatical correctness of picture labelling
9:52am Aug 22 | 10 Comments
- i wonder how this works
6:29am Aug 22 | 2 Comments

Gifts
4 of 12 gifts

- From: Adam
- From: Ann
- From: Yao
- From: Andrew

Like and Interests

- Activities** Running, Yoga, Acrobatics, Blogging
- Interests** Coconut Juice, Polymorphism, The Sun
- Music** Amanda Palmer, The Dresden Dolls, Rasputina, Tom Waits, Opera, Show tunes
- Books** Mrs Dalloway, A Room of One's Own, The Garden of Eden

Show other Pages

Contact Information

- Contact Info**
- Email:** jean.yang.writeme@gmail.com
jeanyang@mit.edu
- Mobile Phone:** [REDACTED]
- Website:** <http://people.csail.mit.edu/jeanyang>
<http://jxyzabc.blogspot.com>
<http://gsc.mit.edu/gwamit>

Suggest Friends for Jean

- Report/Block this Person
- Remove from Friends

Share

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Chat

Summary

51

- Client-side JavaScript
 - ▣ Analysis of JavaScript
 - ▣ eval and code obfuscation
 - ▣ Need for runtime enforcement
- Gatekeeper as illustration
- Browser
 - ▣ Plugins
- Extensions
 - ▣ Firefox extension model
 - ▣ Chrome extension model
 - ▣ Looking forward