You have 80 minutes to answer the questions in this quiz. In order to receive credit you must answer the question as precisely as possible.

Some questions are harder than others, and some questions earn more points than others. You may want to skim them all through first, and attack them in the order that allows you to make the most progress.

If you find a question ambiguous, be sure to write down any assumptions you make. Be neat and legible. If we can’t understand your answer, we can’t give you credit!

Write your name and submission website email address on this cover sheet.

This is an open book, open notes, open laptop exam.
NO INTERNET ACCESS OR OTHER COMMUNICATION.

Please do not write in the boxes below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I  (xx/14)</th>
<th>II (xx/8)</th>
<th>III (xx/10)</th>
<th>IV (xx/8)</th>
<th>V  (xx/12)</th>
<th>VI (xx/6)</th>
<th>VII (xx/12)</th>
<th>VIII (xx/12)</th>
<th>IX (xx/4)</th>
<th>X  (xx/4)</th>
<th>Total (xx/84)</th>
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</table>

Name:

Submission website email address:
I  Lab 1: buffer overflow

Consider the following code similar to http_serve() from Lab 1, where an adversary can supply arbitrary input in the string name. Throughout this part, assume a 32-bit x86 system like the Lab VM, and assume no compiler optimization or ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization).

```c
void http_serve(int fd, const char *name) {
    void (*handler)(int, const char *) = http_serve_none;
    char pn[1024];
    struct stat st;

    getcwd(pn, sizeof(pn));
    strcat(pn, name);
    if (stat(pn, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
        handler = http_serve_file;
    handler(fd, pn);
}
```

1. [6 points]: The figure on the page after the next page shows the stack layout and register values right after http_serve() invokes handler, but before any instruction in handler is executed. Fill in the first column (Q1) next to the figure with letters “a” to “f” from the following options. Each letter indicates the stack content at the corresponding slot. **Note that not every option will be used, and some options may be used more than once.**

   (a) address of pn
   (b) fd
   (c) name
   (d) handler
   (e) return address for http_serve
   (f) return address for handler
2. [4 points]: Ben Bitdiddle notices that there is a vulnerability in the above code that enables a return-to-libc attack. In particular, the attacker can overflow buffer pn[], and trick the server into calling the library function unlink("grades.txt") when http_serve returns. Please show how to mount this attack by smashing the relevant stack slots. Mark your solution on the second column in the figure (Q2), using the following notation:

- Write “unlink” if the slot should be replaced with unlink()’s address.
- Write “argument” if the slot should be replaced with the address of the string "grades.txt".
- Write “preserve” if when overwritten, the slot must keep its original value.
- Write “n/a” if the slot cannot be overwritten.
- Write “any” if the slot will be overwritten, but it does not matter what goes in it.

3. [4 points]: Louis Reasoner argues that Ben’s exploit will not work if the server uses a stack canary. A stack canary is a value that the compiler pushes on stack at function entry, and pops and checks before return. He figures out a way to delete grades.txt even in the presence of a stack canary. Louis’ attack overflows pn[], but in a different way than Ben’s attack. Please briefly describe how should Louis overwrite the stack in this attack.
* Options for Q1:

(a) address of pn  (b) fd  (c) name  (d) handler
(e) return address for http_serve  (f) return address for handler

* Options for Q2:

unlink argument preserve n/a any

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>address of pn</th>
<th>fd</th>
<th>name</th>
<th>handler</th>
<th>return address for http_serve</th>
<th>return address for handler</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0xffffffff</td>
<td>1)</td>
<td>2)</td>
<td>3)</td>
<td>4)</td>
<td>5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

%ebp ---> | saved %ebp | handler | ~ pn[] ~ |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0xffffffff</td>
<td>6)</td>
<td>7)</td>
<td>8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

%esp ---> | ...... | 4) | 5) | 6) | 7) | 8) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0xffffffff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II User authentication

The paper *The Quest to replace passwords* compares many user authentication mechanisms, ranking them on Usability, Deployability, and Security.

4. **[4 points]**: Consider a smartphone-based two-factor scheme that uses text messages as the second factor (e.g., Google’s two factor login or MIT’s Duo). Compare regular passwords to smartphone-based two-factor authentication in terms of usability, deployability, and security. (Briefly explain your answer.)

5. **[4 points]**: Describe an attack that smartphone-based two factor authentication is vulnerable to, but RSA SecurID is less vulnerable to.
III OKWS

The Bank of Barton provides a web site for their customers to transfer money to each other. The web site runs on a single server and uses OKWS (see *Building Secure High-Performance Web Services with OKWS*, by Maxwell Krohn).

The bank’s original design has two OKWS service processes. The login service handles customer login: it checks the customer’s password and issues a session cookie. The banking service handles balance requests and transfers. Both service processes talk to a database proxy via RPC. Each service has its own authentication token which it sends with every RPC so the proxy knows which service is talking to it.

The database proxy accepts the following RPCs:

- `CheckPassword(token, username, password) -> ok, session-cookie`
- `CheckCookie(token, session-cookie) -> ok, username`
- `GetBalance(token, username) -> amount`
- `SetBalance(token, username, amount)`

The proxy uses the token to ensure that only the login service can use the `CheckPassword` RPC, and that only the banking service can call `GetBalance` and `SetBalance`. The proxy doesn’t enforce any other restrictions.

6. [4 points]: Does the separation between login and banking services significantly improve security over a scheme in which they are in the same process? If yes, describe an attack that it prevents; if no, explain why not.
The bank is considering changing their design so that each bank branch has a separate OKWS service process, and a separate authentication token. Each customer is associated with a single branch, and the web site handles all of a customer’s balance/transfer requests in that branch’s service. The web site needs to support bank transfers between customers at different branches.

7. [6 points]: It turns out that the new design won’t help security unless the bank also changes the proxy RPC interface and/or the restrictions the proxy enforces. Describe a new proxy RPC interface and/or set of restrictions that would cause the service-per-branch design to significantly improve security, and outline an attack which your change prevents.
IV Lab 2: privilege separation

Ben Bitdiddle has been working on a secure email server but is having trouble configuring the proper permissions, uids, gids, and supplementary groups. The mail server is designed as follows:

The system is managed by a daemon called postld which is analogous to zookld; it starts other daemons and restarts them if they die. Authentication is managed by the auth service as in the lab.

All incoming mail is received by the smtpd daemon, on port 25 over TCP. When a client connects to smtpd, it can optionally authenticate as a local user. This means that smtpd must be able to check user credentials with the auth server. When smtpd receives a mail message, it handles it in one of two ways depending on the destination address:

A local user: it forwards the message to the mda (mail delivery agent) service for local delivery.

A user on a remote system: it forwards the message to the relayd service for remote delivery if and only if the client has authenticated as a local user (to avoid relaying spam from untrusted users). This is why smtpd must be able to authenticate users.

The following processes are involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>postld</td>
<td>root</td>
<td>root</td>
<td>the launch daemon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smtpd</td>
<td>smtpd</td>
<td>smtpd</td>
<td>receives mail from (remote) clients over smtp and forwards them to the appropriate service if applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relayd</td>
<td>relayd</td>
<td>relayd</td>
<td>receives mail from smtpd and relays it to other mail servers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mda</td>
<td>mda</td>
<td>mda</td>
<td>receives mail from smtpd and delivers it to local users’ inboxes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auth</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td>handles authentication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The directory set up is as follows:

/  
  -- jail/
    -- authsvc/
    |   -- sock auth server socket
    -- relaydsvc/
    |   -- sock relayd server socket
    -- mda/
    |   -- sock mda socket
    -- creds/ credentials database directory (format unspecified).
    -- queue/ the relayd’s outbound mail queue (format unspecified).
    -- mail/
    |   -- user1/ user1's inbox
    |   -- user2/ user2's inbox
8. [8 points]: Please fill in the permissions below such that services have the absolute least permissions necessary to function. There may be multiple correct solutions. Note: A user must have read/write permissions to a socket to connect to it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directory</th>
<th>user</th>
<th>group</th>
<th>permissions (mode)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>++-- jail/</td>
<td>root</td>
<td>root</td>
<td>0755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>++-- authsvc/</td>
<td>auth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>++-- relaydsvc/</td>
<td>relayd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>++-- mda/</td>
<td>mda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>++-- queue/</td>
<td>relayd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++-- mail/</td>
<td>root</td>
<td>root</td>
<td>0755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>++-- user1/</td>
<td>user1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>++-- user2/</td>
<td>user2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
You have a job at a hedge fund evaluating portfolios: deciding which collections of stocks will likely yield the highest returns. On the Web you find a nifty open-source electronic portfolio optimization program called epopt. The program’s documentation says that it reads a file containing the amounts of each stock in a portfolio, computes a better portfolio, and then overwrites the file with the new portfolio. The documentation says that the only input it needs is the portfolio file. epopt expects the file on the command line, like this:

```
epopt /usr/rtm/my-portfolio
```

The code for epopt is millions of lines, and you don’t have time to inspect it all carefully. You are thinking of using Capsicum to improve the security of epopt (see the paper Capsicum: practical capabilities for UNIX by Watson et al.).

For each of the following scenarios, indicate whether Capsicum can be used to protect against it. If yes, briefly outline how; if no, briefly explain why not.

9. [3 points]: Can Capsicum prevent epopt from sending a copy of the input portfolio file to your competitor over the Internet?

10. [3 points]: Can Capsicum prevent epopt from modifying your portfolio file to contain a lower-quality set of stocks?

11. [3 points]: Can Capsicum prevent epopt from writing a copy of your portfolio into the file /tmp/.hidden?
12. [3 points]: Can Capsicum prevent an exploit in which you download a portfolio file from somewhere on the web, and give it to epopt as input, but the file contains cleverly-crafted contents that trigger a buffer overflow bug in epopt?
VI Native Client

Native Client runs untrusted assembly code inside a sandbox using software fault isolation. The sandboxed module is located in the address range 0 to 256 Mbyte. Through a trampoline, the sandboxed module can call into a service runtime, which is located above the address 256 Mbyte. The service runtime is trusted and provides functions for I/O etc. Two of the service functions available to the sandboxed module are `mmap(dst, src, len)` and `munmap(addr, len)`. `mmap` allocates `len` bytes of memory and maps the memory into the virtual address range specified by `dst` and `len`, first initializing it by copying `len` bytes starting from `src`. `munmap` allows the module to remove the specified address range from the process’ address space. Native client checks that the module doesn’t `mmap` memory outside of its sandbox.

13. [6 points]: How can an attacker use `mmap` and `munmap` to break out of a module’s sandbox? (Outline an attack in enough detail so that we can decide if it works. Several attacks possible; you have to give only one.)
**VII  Intel SGX**

Ben develops a password manager for a bank using SGX’s secure attestation features. The bank distributes the password manager to its customers, and they install it on their SGX-enabled computers. When a customer logs into the bank, the bank verifies that Ben’s code is running inside the enclave before sending any secret to the enclave.

14. **[6 points]**: The string library that runs inside the enclave and is used by code inside the enclave turns out to have a buffer overrun exploit. Ben’s friend Sam says that SGX is so powerful that exploiting buffer overflows is not possible and that Ben doesn’t have to worry about them. Explain why Sam is wrong. (Give a scenario in which an attacker can exploit a buffer overrun and explain why attestation doesn’t prevent this attack.)
VIII Symbolic Execution

Recall from the EXE paper (EXE: Automatically Generating Inputs of Death) that, under certain circumstances, EXE forks execution in order to explore different paths (see the EXE paper’s Section 2). For each of the two functions below, how many forks would each cause in total? The argument x is symbolic. Assume that the compiler does not optimize the code, and that EXE has enough time to follow all paths.

```c
int f1(int x)
{
    int z = 0;
    int i;
    for(i = 0; i < 10; i++){
        if(x == i){
            z += 1;
            break;
        }
    }
    return z;
}
```

Note the `break` inside the if statement, which causes the loop to terminate if the if condition is true.

15. [4 points]: How many forks for f1() above?
int 
f2(int x[10])
{
    int z = 0;
    int i;
    for(i = 0; i < 10; i++){
        if(x[i] == 1){
            z += 1;
        }
    }
    return z;
}

Note that x is an array of symbolic integers, and that there is no break inside the if statement.

16. [4 points]: How many forks for f2() above?

Suppose you have a server with a secret (in theSecret) that it should only reveal under certain circumstances. Your server contains this code that calls authCheck() to decide if the client input implies that it’s OK to reveal the secret, and (if yes) it calls emit() to send the secret to the client.

    if(authCheck(input))
        emit(theSecret);

The input variable holds a complete HTTP request (URL, cookies, and other HTTP headers). You are worried that there might be logical bugs in authCheck() that cause it to return true in situations where theSecret should not be revealed.

17. [4 points]: Outline how you could use EXE to help you gain confidence that authCheck() works correctly.
IX Android security

Consider the Friend application described in the paper *Understanding Android Security*. The FriendTracker application defines the permissions READ_FRIENDS and WRITE_FRIENDS, which are used to limit access to the FriendProvider component in the FriendTracker application.

18. [4 points]: Does the Android security system ensure that no other application than the FriendViewer application can read from the FriendProvider component? (Briefly explain your answer.)
We’d like to hear your opinions about 6.858. Any answer, except no answer, will receive full credit.

19. [2 points]: Are there things you’d like to see improved in the second half of the semester?

20. [2 points]: Is there one paper out of the ones we have covered so far in 6.858 that you think we should definitely remove next year? If not, feel free to say that.

End of Quiz